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 Introduction to an Epic Trilogy: 
Implications for Class Arbitration, 
Regulatory Administration,  
and Labor Law in  
Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis. 
Robert L. Temple* 
I. A SYNOPSIS OF THE CASE 
On April 2, 2014 Epic Systems Corporation, a healthcare software company, 
sent an email to a subset of its employees.  The email contained within it an arbitra-
tion agreement, mandating that claims centering on wage-and-hour compensation 
could only be brought through individual arbitration, and “the right to receive . . . 
relief from any class, collective, or representative proceeding” was waived out-
right.1  Further, acceptance of this agreement was implied if the employees contin-
ued their employment; no option to decline was provided.2  Jacob Lewis, then a 
“technical writer” at Epic, complied with these instructions and acknowledged this 
agreement.  Later, Lewis filed a suit against Epic in Federal court, ignoring the 
arbitration agreement and alleging that the corporation had violated the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”).  Epic moved to have the case dismissed per the arbitration 
agreement, but Lewis responded that the arbitration clause violated the National 
Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) because of its interference with the employees’ 
right to engaged in “concerted activities.”3 
Since the Supreme Court decision in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. 
Mercury Construction Corp, lower courts have, following the lead of the Court, by 
and large favored employment arbitration agreements.4  However, there has been 
some disagreement.  In Morris v. Ernst & Young, the Ninth circuit invalidated the 
types of agreement at issue before the Seventh circuit,5 while in contrast, the Sec-
ond, Fifth, and Eighth circuits enforced such agreements.6  In the end, the Seventh 
would join the Ninth circuit, invalidating the agreement and holding that it violated 
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 1. Lewis v. Epic System Corporation, 823 F.3d. 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. See also, e.g., National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
 4. Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1620 (2018). 
 5. Morris v. Ernst and Young, LLP, 834 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 6. See D.R. Horton Inc. v. National Labor Relations Board, 737 F.3d. 344 (5th Cir. 2013); Sutherland 
v. Ernst & Young, 727 F.3d 290 (2nd Cir. 2013) and Owen v. Bristol Care Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 
2016). 
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the National Labor Relations Act and could not be enforced under the Federal Ar-
bitration Act (“FAA”).7  The Seventh circuit deferred to the National Labor Rela-
tions Board’s (“NRLB”) interpretation of the NLRA, holding that the right to en-
gage in “concerted” activities per section 7 of the NLRA includes the right to file 
collective and class actions8 and is further protected by section 8, which prohibits 
employers from “interfere[ing] with [or] restrain[ing]” the rights contained in sec-
tion 7.9 
Fast forward three years.  The Supreme Court had taken up the Epic case, along 
with Ernst and Young LLP v. Morris and NLRB v. Murphy Oil.  Oral arguments 
were heard on October, 2 2017 with Mr. Paul Clement and Mr. Richard Griffin 
representing the employers and the NLRB, respectively.10  On May 21, 2018 the 
Court decided the case and in a 5-4 vote reversed the Seventh Circuit’s holding.  
The case also served as the opportunity for Justice Gorsuch to set his pen to paper 
as the author of his first Supreme Court opinion.  The majority held that the NLRA 
should be read as not to interfere or disrupt the enforceability of arbitration agree-
ments, which are governed under the FAA.11  The majority’s decision focused on a 
three-pronged explanation. 
First, the majority argued that, through an analysis of plain meaning and his-
torical interpretation, the FAA mandates that courts favor arbitration and enforce 
and respect the arbitration procedures chosen by the parties.12  Although the Court 
did address the saving clause in section two of the FAA, which allows for courts to 
vacate arbitration agreements that are found to be illegal,13 the majority held that it 
did not apply in this case, as the saving clause can only be used to invalidate an 
arbitration agreement based on factors that would make any contract unenforcea-
ble.14  The use of Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA to overcome the historical favorit-
ism toward arbitration of the FAA would, in the majority’s view, violate the saving 
clause.15 
The majority then moved its analysis to the NLRA, stating reasons as to why 
Section 7 did not cement collective litigation as a right.16  Section 7 gives workers 
“the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain 
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other 
concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or 
protection.17  
However, the majority held that it would be a step too far for the Court to infer, 
from these sections, protection for class actions.  Congress inserted into Section 7 
rules for the recognition of exclusive bargaining representatives, picketing, strikes, 
                                                          
 7. Lewis v. Epic System Corporation, 823 F.3d. 1147, 1150 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 8. Lewis, at 1152–53. 
 9. Id. 
 10. National Labor Relations Board v. Murphy Oil USA, SCOTUS Blog, http://www.sco-
tusblog.com/case-files/cases/national-labor0relations-board-v-murphy-oil-usa-inc/ (last visited Nov. 21, 
2018). 
 11. Lewis, at 1619–20. 
 12. Id. at 1621. 
 13. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 14. Epic, at 1622. 
 15. Id. at 1622–23. 
 16. Id. at 1625. 
 17. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). 
2
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2019, Iss. 1 [2019], Art. 9
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2019/iss1/9
No. 2] Epic Trilogy 113 
and adjudicatory proceedings under the NLRA18  The majority points out that no-
where does Section 7 set forth rules for collective actions in either court or arbitra-
tion.19  This lack of comparable guidance for collective action, which exists in Sec-
tion 7 for other protected activities, convinced the Court that Section 7 did not guar-
antee protection to such collective claims.20  The employees responded that the 
NLRA does not contain any of these provisions because the NLRA confers rights 
to procedures which already exist under other statutes or laws.21  The Court replied 
that if the employees are citing existing procedures, then they must recognize the 
laws which limit said procedures.22 
Finally, the court addressed the employees’ argument that the NLRA and the 
FAA are in conflict, and that the NLRA should overcome provisions within the 
FAA. The majority stated that the Court had, in the past, refused to entertain con-
flicts between the FAA and other federal statutes,23 and that, barring some specific 
mention of arbitration or class action within a statute, the FAA would not be over-
come in this scenario either.  In the end, the majority claimed that its decision in 
Epic Systems protects the legislative intent behind the NLRA and rejects the dis-
sent’s opinion that the Court is ushering in a return to the Lochner era of Court 
entanglement in legislative policy judgments.24 
II. THE JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION’S RESPONSE TO EPIC SYSTEMS. 
On May 21, 2018, the Journal of Dispute Resolution began the process of so-
liciting responses to the ruling in Epic Systems v. Lewis, as the importance of the 
case was immediately clear. The Journal, along with its faculty advisor Professor 
S.I. Strong, decided a single case note or comment was insufficient, and instead, 
sought a trio of works, focusing on the class arbitration, labor law, and regulatory 
and administration law implications of the ruling. With help from the University of 
Missouri Center for Dispute Resolution, three authors were asked and agreed to 
answer the call for scholarship. 
What follows are three separate articles, each focusing on various implications 
of the Epic Systems decision.  Professor Lise Gelernter writes from the perspective 
of labor law, focusing on the case’s impact on non-unionized workers, the employ-
ers themselves, and the implications of the ruling on the National Labor Relations 
Act.  Professor Maria Glover examines the class arbitration standpoint.  She begins 
by tracing the Court’s employment law jurisprudence since the October Term in 
2017, discussing the regulatory consequences of these opinions and how she be-
lieves the Court’s opinions reflect political commitments that discriminate between 
claims and claimants.  Finally, Professor Daniel Deacon provides the regulatory 
administration perspective of the decision, arguing that the Court erred in the ruling 
and discussing how its error will affect the future of administrative law.  
                                                          
 18. Epic, at 1625. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Examples include the Sherman and Clayton Acts, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the 
Credit Repair Organizations Act, Securities Act of 1933, the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, and 
the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 
 24. Epic, at 1630. 
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With a top-notch slate of authors, The Journal of Dispute Resolution is proud 
to present the following analyses of the Court’s continued commitment to enforcing 
individual arbitration under the FAA. 
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